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This article aims to clarify the epistemological foundations of the Freudian energetics
model, starting with a historical review of the 19th century scientific context in which
Freud’s research lay down its roots. Beyond the physiological and anatomical references
of Project for a Scientific Psychology (Freud, 1895a), the physiology Freud makes
reference to is in reality primarily anchored in an epistemological model derived from
physics. Whilst across the Rhine, the autonomy of physiology in relation to physics was
far from being accomplished, as a counterpoint, in France, the revolution in physiology
driven by Claude Bernard established itself autonomously from physics,. In contrast,
Freud’s scientific landscape is entirely dominated by the physics elevated to the rank
of an ideal science. The influence of Helmholtz, who is both a medical doctor and a
physicist, has a determining influence on Freud’s training. The discoveries in physics
at that time, in particular the formulation of the principle of ‘conservation of force’ –
first principle of thermodynamics – will constitute the points of reference upon which
Freud will elaborate his energetics model, then subsequently, the idea of economy in his
metapsychology. In this way we can trace both the historic and epistemological path
that led Freud from a concept based on physics, and more specifically thermodynamic
energy, to an idea of nervous energy that constitutes the basis of the concept of
“quantity” as it is stated as ‘first fundamental idea’ in Project for a Scientific Psychology
(Freud, 1895a). This notion will subsequently evolve, and lead Freud to the introduction
of the concept of ‘psychical energy,’ this time in a purely metapsychological sense.
Keywords: energy, Freud, thermodynamics, epistemology, Helmholtz, physics
INTRODUCTION
The economics point of view of Freudian metapsychology today offers astonishing points of
convergence with recent discoveries in contemporary neurosciences, in that it is based explicitly
from its first formulations on an energetics model. In 1895 Freud had, in Project for a Scientific
Psychology, proposed a first principle for the functioning of the psyche, the “principle of neuronal
inertia” (Freud, 1895a, p. 296). Freud defined this as the tendency of neurones to divest themselves
completely of the quantities of excitation (endogenous or exogenous) that erupt into the psychical
apparatus. The primary function of this apparatus would therefore be to reduce to the lowest level
possible – ideally a ‘level = zero’ - the quantity of free energy. This fundamental hypothesis of all the
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 October 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1861
fpsyg-09-01861 October 11, 2018 Time: 11:0 # 2
Tran The et al. The Epistemological Foundations of Freud’s Energetics Model
economic dimension of Freudian metapsychology – which would
be later refined in the definitions of the principle of pleasure and
the death drive – has recently been put into perspective through
the neuroscientific work of Karl Friston and his colleagues.
Indeed Friston and his colleagues see cerebral functioning
through a Bayesian approach, its aim being to avoid too great
a variation in the quantity of free energy coming from our
sensorial perceptions (both internal and external) on the basis of
prediction of sensorial data. This offers an unexpected point of
dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience centered on an
energetics concept of cerebral function.
While the energetics concept of the psychical function
proposed by Freud can offer fruitful points of discussion with
neurobiology, it is important to return to the epistemological
roots of Freudian energetics in order to pin-point their theoretical
origins. The first arguments of Project for a Scientific Psychology
(Freud, 1895a) do indeed seem to correspond to a biological, even
neurobiological, model. In his text, Freud introduces a ‘theory of
neurons’. This theory constitutes one of the ‘two fundamental
concepts’ that he bases his work on, alongside the concept of
‘quantities’ understood in terms of energy. However, a brief
excursion into the history of the epistemological origins of his
concept of nervous energy will enable us to glimpse that this is
not truly a biological model. It is on the contrary a paradigm
that is radically linked to physics, inspired by work done on the
conservation of force, and profoundly influenced by the School
of Helmholtz. This journey, following the origins in physicalism
of Freudian energetics, will thus serve as a basis for a model
dialog between psychoanalysis and neurosciences, where the
heterogeneous epistemological roots of these two disciplines can
be taken into account.
THE PHYSICALIST PARADIGM OF THE
BERLINER PHYSIKALISCHE
GESELLSCHAFT
In France, beginning in the 1860s, the “revolution in physiology”
(Prochiantz, 1990) brought about by Claude Bernard made
a radical epistemological leap by establishing physiology as a
discipline in itself. This was autonomous in relation to physics–
chemistry (even though Claude Bernard will always postulate
a strict physico-chemical determinism of the vital phenomena).
Bernard did indeed claim the existence of an undeniable
singularity of the vital aspect amongst all other physico-chemical
aspects, while at the same time strongly criticizing any vitalist
stance. According to him, within the organic, “the mechanism is
special [. . .], the agent is specific, though the result is identical. No
single chemical phenomenon occurs within the body similarly to
outside of it” (Bernard, 1885, p. 219). It was in this singularity of
the vital mechanism that the concept of homeostasis was rooted,
and was later theorized by Cannon, to then be elevated to the rank
of physiological mechanism central to all biology.
It was at a time exactly contemporary to the last Bernardian
conceptualizations (the Leçon sur les phénomènes de la vie are
published in 1878, the year Claude Bernard dies), but in a
radically different geographic and scientific context, that Freud
undertook his medical studies at the Vienna Faculty in the
autumn of 1873 (Jones, 1953). Across the Rhine the autonomy
of physiology in respect to physics was far from having been
realized, and it was on the contrary within an epistemological
paradigm that was decidedly antagonistic to that of French
biology, that Freud’s scientific training was conducted. At the
conclusion of his third year Freud joined Ernest Brücke, whom
he saw as a “model” (Freud, 1925d, p. 9), at his laboratory of
physiology. Besides the respect and admiration Freud felt for
this undisputed master (Jones, 1953), this filiation bore witness
to an affiliation to a whole scientific paradigm of which Freud
will make himself the heir. As Jones underlines, Brücke’s institute
was closely connected with the school of Helmholtz. The story
of this scientific movement had begun in the 1840s with the
friendships between different physiologists trained in Johannes
Müller’s theories on the energy specific to nerves (Assoun,
1981). Du Bois-Reymond, Brücke, Helmholtz, and Ludwig came
across as medical doctors imbued with a real “crusading spirit”
(Jones, 1953) who, as Du Bois-Reymond reported, had “pledged
a solemn oath to put into effect this truth: “No other forces
than the common physical-chemical ones are active within the
organism.” ” (Jones, 1953, p. 40). Although they all had medical
training, their scientific ideas where totally subordinated to
physics. This small group, increased by the addition of new
members, young student physicists and physiologists in leagued
against vitalism, became in 1845 the Berliner Physikalische
Gesellschaft, Berlin Physical Society (Jones, 1953). Within less
than 30 years they will dominate the German scientific landscape
becoming the most influential professors of medicine and
physiology of their time, and in turn training a whole generation
of students to which Freud and Wundt belonged. The majority of
these professors can be equated with what Paul-Laurent Assoun
calls the figure of the “doctor-physician,” of whom Fechner,
Helmholtz, or Lotze will be the principle representatives: “all
of them come to physics through medicine or via physiology”
(Assoun, 1981, p. 59). For some of them, psychology would
constitute the final stage of the journey. It is this scientific
practice characterized by its diversity and lack of specialization
that Freud would inherit during his years of training at the
Brücke Institute. However, it is physics that constitutes for all
the related disciplines the epistemological model par excellence. It
can be observed that the German school of physiology positioned
itself in a movement that was the exact opposite of Bernardian
physiology: where in France there was a call for a certain
independence of physiology as a separate science, autonomous
from physics, the Berlin medical practitioners would on the
contrary seek to subordinate physiology to physics, making it
an extension of the latter. Brücke thus appears as one of the
paradigmatic representatives of this trend:
“What is physiology in Brücke’s eyes? This is not a pointless
question to ask, for the mistake would be to project onto that
word the concept formed in the parallel tradition, in France,
by Claude Bernard. Physiology for Brücke, leader of the Berlin
Physics Society around 1845, is an extension of physics. It has as
its object specific physico-Chemical systems, the organisms [. . .].
The physiologist is none other than the physicist of organisms”
(Assoun, 1981, pp. 101–102).
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THE INFLUENCE OF HELMHOLTZ
Thus it was to a physiology radically subordinated to physics, the
overruling dominant science – to which all natural phenomena
must be brought back, including those relative to living
organisms – that Freud would make himself heir. It is within
this orientation that he trained at the Brücke Institute. However
the dominant influence of Helmholtz, who of all the scientists
at the Berlin Physics Society was without doubt the most
eminent, needs to be emphasized. Freud considered him one
of his “idols” (Jones, 1953), and would always regret not
having had the opportunity to meet him in person. Helmholtz,
perfect embodiment of the figure of the ‘doctor-physician,’ would
dominate the German university scene at a time when it was
becoming a model and a center of European science. According
to him: “all natural phenomena must be brought back to the
movement of material particles endowed with invariant driving
forces, dependent only on their spatial location” (Prigogine and
Stengers, 1979, p. 148). In this he made himself the advocate
of an understanding of nature based on mechanical ideas, and
the majority of the physiologist of the powerful German school
(Liebig, Ludwig, Müller, Du Bois-Reymond, Virchow, Brücke)
would adopt his concept according to which “the physico-
chemical functioning of the living organism is subject to the same
laws as inanimate matter, and must be studies within the same
terms” (Prigogine and Stengers, 1979, p. 148).
To understand the influence of this physicalist model in
19th century Germany, it is important to underline that it
made its appearance as a reaction to the influence of Schelling’s
Naturphilosophie. A Romantic philosophy that argued for a
pantheist monism close to mysticism (Jones, 1953). This
philosophy saw nature as a unique fundamental great organism,
unified by general laws, by a single principle of causality, and
without remainder (Prigogine and Stengers, 1979). While this
idealistic concept of nature was spread across all of Europe,
German Naturphilosophie was characterized by its aspiration
to what Schelling described as a ‘speculative physics.’ It is
against this romantic view of a speculative philosophy, for
which Helmholtz or Du Bois-Reymond feel a real aversion,
that the physicalism of the Berlin Physics Society positioned
itself (Meulders, 2001). Freud had been tempted in his youth
by these ideas before definitively converting to the views of
physicalist science. It was, according to Ernest Jones, under the
influence of Goethe that Freud went through a brief period of
Naturphilosophie, before becoming enthused by the competing
physical physiology. In The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud,
1900a), Freud mentions that 1 day a violent philosophical
discussion with a student, partisan of natural philosophy, nearly
led him to a duel. Jones comments on this reactive movement in
these terms:
“Physical physiology – although not by itself – overthrew
this philosophy and took its place. As has happened before, the
conqueror introjected the emotionalism of the victim. ‘Unity of
science,’ ‘science,’ ‘physical forces’ were not merely directing ideas
or hypotheses of scientific endeavor: they became almost objects
of worship. They were more than methods of research – they
became a Weltanschauung.” (Jones, 1953, p.43)
This very strong physicalist scientific ideal, almost raised to
a status of religious conviction, appears then to be a virulent
reaction to any vitalist views. The radical character of this
epistemological model, where philosophy finds itself completely
subjugated to physical science, contrasts in a notable way with
the Bernardian view which according to Canguilhem constitutes
a third pathway between vitalism and reductionism (Canguilhem,
1994). Thus, as Alain Prochiantz points out, up until Claude
Bernard “the relationship of biology to physics was divided
between complete assimilation in a physicalist reductionism, and
radical separation within French vitalism or the German natural
philosophy” (Prochiantz, 1990, p. 35). Bernardians therefore
rejected both mechanism and vitalism to constitute a third
position, adjusting the technique of biological experimentation
to the singularity of its object of study, the living.
If the radical physicalism of the German school of physiology
is to be understood through the prism of this opposition to
the dominant position of natural philosophy (a position whose
influence on scientific speculation had been much stronger across
the Rhine) it is also to be situated in the context of the discovery in
physics of the conservation of energy. Helmholtz was one of the
first theoreticians of the conservation of energy. We can, along
with Prigogine and Stengers, note the paradoxical fact that the
philosophical past of Germany had imbued the scientists, in spite
of them, with “an idea far removed from the strictly positivist
knowledge that they professed to practice: the idea that nature,
in its entirety and without remainder, is unified by a general
law, by a single principle of causality” (Prigogine and Stengers,
1979, p. 175). Something akin to a return of the suppressed
Naturphilosophie against which they had positioned themselves.
THE PRINCIPLE OF THE
CONSERVATION OF FORCE
Unifying of physiology and physics resulted from this supposed
universal principle of the conservation of energy, according to
which “the sum of the forces remains constant in all isolated
systems” (Assoun, 1981, p. 102). If Helmholtz was one of
the first theoreticians of the principle of the conservation of
force, it is Mayer who is considered to have introduced the
fundamental distinction between force and matter. Thus it is
not surprising, in view of the continuity that existed between
physiology and physics to which it is subordinated, that one
of the major discoveries of 19th century physics, the principle
of the conservation of energy introduced by Mayer in 1852,
would have significant consequences for the development of
physiology, psychology, and ultimately psychoanalysis (Assoun,
1981). However it is probable that for these two figures of the
‘doctor-physicist’ that are Hemholtz and Mayer – whose mixed
practice was correlative of the porous nature of the boundaries
between connected disciplines in the German scientific context –
it was originally the studies of living organisms that conferred
upon them the intuition of this principle. Their experimental
and theoretical scientific practice was in reality so interconnected,
moving between the study of living organisms and the inanimate,
that it is difficult to establish the physical or physiological
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pre-eminence of the observation of the conservation of force
(which will subsequently be reformulated as the principle of
the conservation of energy). It would be more relevant, rather
than to look for such a pre-eminence, to underline that these
‘great men’ of the 19th century [as Ostwald calls them in
his biographical study (Ostwald, 1912)] were accustomed to a
mental gymnastics that allowed them to move without difficulty
from physiology to physics, and back again. Their experimental
practice in one of these two sciences, leading them naturally
to theoretical formulations that were equally valid in the other.
This practice was justified by a presupposition inherited from
Kantian philosophy: nature is ruled by the law of causality, in
so far as all change in nature is due to a sufficient cause. As
we have seen though, some remanent of the influence of the
Naturphilosophie (to which they were in fact vigorously opposed)
led these doctor-physicists to seek a single principle of causality
that would unify nature (both organic and inanimate) in a whole
without remainder (Prigogine and Stengers, 1979).
According to Prigogine and Stenger when Mayer, as a young
doctor in the Dutch colonies of Java, observed the bright-red
color of one of his patients’ blood, he concluded from this that
since it was warmer in the tropics the inhabitants would need
to burn less oxygen. On the basis of this observation, he made
an assessment of the consumption of oxygen, which could be
considered as a source of energy, and consumptions linked to
the maintaining of body temperature with respect to thermic
loss, and to manual labor. Mayer generalized the implications
of this assessment (which already amounted to an interpretation
with respect to the observed facts) to conclude the existence of a
“single and indestructible force that is the basis of all phenomena
both of living and inanimate nature” (Prigogine and Stengers,
1979, p. 175–176). This thesis of a single energetic principle
offered to physiology the grounds for its claim to reduce the
‘vital process’ down to a mechanical chain of event (Assoun,
1981). Mayer’s observations in the tropics thus led him to argue
that the body’s heat was the result of the chemical energy of
food, and he went so far as to assert that the mechanical energy
of muscles came from the same origin: mechanical energy,
chemical energy, and heat would thus be equivalent and mutually
convertible. Back in Germany, he established himself as a doctor
and continued his research. He went on to demonstrate that there
exists an equivalence between thermic and mechanical work, and
calculated that the quantity of heat was equal to a given quantity
of mechanical energy. He would present this thesis in 1842 in his
Remarks on the Forces of Inorganic Nature (Brossollet, 2018).
As Paul-Laurent Assoun points out, “Mayer appears as the
Lavoisier of the 19th century, perpetuating the grand principle of
the conservation of matter” (Assoun, 1981, p. 60) turning it into
a principle of conservation of force; which would become, after
the introduction of the terms by Thomson in 1850, the principle
of conservation of energy. This discovery could therefore, have
come from physiology, to then be theorized and formulated
in mathematical equations in the domain of physics, before
returning to physiology where its consequences would lead to
the development by Wundt of scientific psychology, on the
basis of this same principle. Wundt would, it appears, have
extended “for the first time, the law of conservation of force to
the area of psychology” (Assoun, 1981, p. 60). The discovery
of the principle of conservation of energy would also have a
notable influence on the thinking of the young Freud. However,
this circular phenomenon within German scientific knowledge
makes it difficult to establish with certainty the provenance of this
principle, whether it was from physiology or physics. Researchers
like Mayer or Helmholtz moved into a larger unifying paradigm,
where the absence of clear cut lines between disciplines, and a
mixed scientific practice (combining both medical practice and
research in physics) was completely foreign to the establishing
of distinctions between disciplines. This was made possible in
France by the advent, with Claude Bernard, of experimental
physiology. We can thus argue, as Paul-Laurent Assoun proposes,
that from the 1840s “a kind of practice is put in place, that
comes simultaneously from physiology, physics, and chemistry;
emerging from common and converging interests within a matrix
of energetics” (Assoun, 1981, p. 60).
For Mayer then, the vital aspect resulted from the
transformation of force or matter, and the task of physiology
would consist henceforth in the investigation into the
mechanisms of this transformation (Assoun, 1981). His work
would also be in close relation with the experimental chemistry
ushered into Germany by Liebig. Liebig who would contribute
to the development of organic chemistry through the study of
the chemical processes of living matter (it is indeed in Liebig’s
review that Mayer’s historic memoir on the conservation of force
was published). The chemistry of Liebig is essentially analytic:
his method consisted in an analysis of the constituent parts of
organisms, and he held that it was possible to go from a vegetable
compound to an animal compound through the subtraction of
constituents (Assoun, 1981). As Paul-Laurent Assoun remarks,
this analytic organic chemistry of Liebig’s, in close relation with
the work of Mayer, would make a deep impression on Freud who,
in giving the name of ‘psychoanalysis’ to his discovery, would
borrow specifically the term ‘analysis’ from the breaking down of
the chemical compounds in experimental chemistry inspired by
Liebig (Assoun, 1981).
In 1842, in his Remarks on the Forces of Inorganic Nature,
Mayer did not yet refer to the concept of energy (which will only
appear after 1850 in the writings of Thomson, then Rankine), but
held to the definition of the concept of ‘force.’ Thus “the Mayerian
project was clearly to ensure the epistemological promotion of
the idea of ‘force”’ (Assoun, 1981, p. 159). While in Germany,
the dynamical view inherited from Leibniz and Kant had made
force the primary concept, the school of Laplace considered it as
an emanation derived from matter. Mayer did not adopt a strict
dynamism, since he established an analogy between matter and
force. According to him, matter was the fundamental concept
of chemistry, ponderable, transformable, and quantitatively
indestructible during chemical reactions (where mass would
always be conserved, although the quality, for example of oxygen
and hydrogen, will not be seen in water) (Locqueneux, 2009).
We can already observe here, in chemistry, the hypothesis of a
qualitative transformation that nevertheless implies that quantity
remains the same; something that Mayer would also apply to
force. As Robert Locqueneux underlines, “the role held by matter
in chemistry should, according to Mayer, be played by force in
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physics” (Locqueneux, 2009, p. 113). Force would therefore also
be an indestructible and transformable entity just like matter;
but, unlike matter, imponderable. Thus, the inanimate forces of
nature could take on multiple qualitative forms: kinetic, thermic,
magnetic, electrical, or chemical force. These are qualitative
forms that would be phenomenologically distinct manifestation
of a same entity, an Urkraft, ‘elemental force,’ (a quest for a primal
unique force that is not dissimilar to the Naturphilosopie’s project,
although Mayer was opposed to this). Yet, Mayer was the first
to try to establish a quantitative science of force and no longer
an only qualitative one: he determined through calculation the
mechanical equivalent of heat. The aim was not here to make heat
a kind of movement, but to “determine the equivalence between
the disappearance of a quantity of heat, and the simultaneous
production of movement” (Locqueneux, 2009, p. 114). In this way
he would propose an equation for the equivalence between heat
and movement (that is to say work in the mechanical meaning of
the word). For indeed, according to Mayer,
“If two metals are rubbed together, there is movement
that disappears and heat that develops; hence the question: if
the movement is the cause of the heat [. . .]. If we cannot
account for the disappearance of the movement, without
admitting a causal relation between the movement and the
heat; it is not possible to understand, without admitting this
connection, how the heat develops. It is demonstrated that, in
many cases, the disappearance of the movement has no other
appreciable consequences than this production of heat” (Mayer,
In: Locqueneux, 2009, p. 131).
Mayer then, assumed that the latent heat was transformed
in its entirely into a quantity of work: this was a qualitative
transformation (the mechanical force was turned into a force
of a different nature on a phenomenal level, heat), but one
that implied a conservation, an equivalence, from a quantitative
point of view. He illustrated this with the example of hydraulic
mechanisms where the movement, as it destroys itself, provokes
a considerable quantity of heat; and also with steam machines
where the reverse takes place, it is the heat that provokes
movement. There is then a principle of equivalence, that
also implies a reversibility, between movement and heat, as
two qualitatively distinct aspects of a same original force
(Locqueneux, 2009).
Three years after this work on the forces in inanimate nature,
Mayer would return to questions of physiology and write a
memoir on The Motions of Organisms and their Relation to
Metabolism (1845). He described his project as a desire to
“fill the chasm that separates exact physics and physiology”
for which “a method that would seek to bring together these
two sciences under this one perspective, would be invaluable
for physiology” (Mayer, 1845, In: Assoun, 1981, p. 163). This
union between physiology and physics was thus sealed by the
reunion of the heterogeneous phenomena observed by these
two disciplines under an overruling principle. This overruling
principle would be the conservation of force – subsequently
translated into conservation of energy. In both organic and
inorganic phenomena, there would therefore be only one force
at work. A force that would manifest itself under a qualitatively
distinct phenomenology: “this circular force through a perpetual
exchange, in inanimate nature as well as in living nature. In
both domains, there is no phenomenon without transformation
of force” (Mayer, 1845, In: Assoun, 1981, p. 164), that force
remaining constant beyond all its transformations.
If it has therefore been so essential to consider, at such length,
the concept in physics of the principle of conservation, it is that,
as has so rightly pointed out Paul-Laurent Assoun, “not only
do physiology and physics take their inspiration from it, they
are also closely involved in its evolution. It is too little to say
that physics extends to or is applied to psychophysiology, there
is an imbrication of the two” (Assoun, 1981, p. 166). We have
been able to observe that the intuition of the conservation of
energy had been for Mayer influenced by his medical practice,
in connection with his physiological research on ‘body heat.’
It was in effect while meditating on the production of body
heat through combustion, that he was able to deduce the
principle of conservation. However, after having theorized from
a purely physical point of view the conservation of force in
‘inanimate nature,’ he would come back to a physiological
application of this energy gain. Thus, “energetism is introduced
into psychophysiology not by a simple extension, but as an
annex field of verification of one and the same idea” (Assoun,
1981, p. 166) The implication of this is that at no time did
Freud feel that he was ‘borrowing’ concepts from physics or
physiology, rather he was ‘managing his property,’ in as much as
this energetics model was an inherent part of his ‘scientific cradle.’
In this sense, Project for a Scientific Psychology (Freud, 1895a) is a
paradigmatic example of the importance of this heritage (Assoun,
1981).
While Mayer was the first to establish the principle of
conservation of force in physics, and to give an equation for
the equivalence between heat and movement, Helmholtz would
pursue his project by applying this principle to physiology
(Assoun, 1981). Freud would recognize him as his idol – indeed
Helmholtz would dominate the German University scene in
the 19th century. It was then, essentially through Helmholtz’s
work, that Freud would assimilate the principle of conservation
of energy, and its applications to physiology. In his memoir
of 1847, On the Conservation of Force, Helmholtz in the first
instance excludes any possibility of ‘perpetual motion’. In this he
was going against the generally held view according to which,
an inexhaustible and constantly renewed ‘vital force’ would
maintain the activities of living organism, and would control the
activities of physical and chemical forces (Locqueneux, 2009).
The impossibility of perpetual motion had already been justified
in mechanics. However, Helmholtz extended it to the whole of
nature by applying it to natural forces of a different order to
mechanical forces, forces such as heat, electricity, magnetism,
light, and chemical reactions: “there does not exist, in all the
series of natural actions, a process that would permit the creation
of mechanical force without an equal expenditure” (Helmholtz,
1847, In: Locqueneux, 2009, p. 124). Thus it would be impossible
to imagine, in nature, a machine that would present perpetual
motion – a swing or a pendulum, for example, would eventually
stop under the effect of friction and the loss of heat that
results (Meulders, 2001). We might be tempted to counter this
impossibility with the definition of inertia, posed by Newton as
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the first law of classical physics, that consist in the tendency of
bodies to maintain their speed. However, this universal property
only allows for the conceptualization of perpetual motion under
abstract conditions, in a closed system, protected from any other
force other than the one that had caused the body’s speed. This
case is thus utopian, and not observable in nature. It would
require the existence of a closed space, in a vacuum, and without
friction. Yet, even in this fictional case it would be, as Michel
Meulders points out, inappropriate to speak of ‘perpetual motion,’
since at rest bodies are immobile and that only an external force
could have put them into motion (Meulders, 2001). There exists
then a certain ambiguity, as Pierre Costabel points out, in classical
physics’, between its posit of the impossibility of perpetual motion
and its definition of inertial movement (Costabel). For Helmholtz
then, the impossibility of perpetual motion was correlative to
the principle of conservation of force, according to which there
could only be creation of movement through a corresponding
expenditure of energy. Thus the impossibility of perpetual
motion is heir to Leibniz’s dynamics. Leibniz had indeed been
the first to profess the impossibility of ‘mechanical’ perpetual
motion based on the elementary metaphysical principle that it is
impossible to create from nothing, ex nihilo (Costabel).
For Helmholtz, all actions of nature must then be brought
back, in the final instance, to the opposition of the two forces
of repulsion and attraction, as they were formulated by Newton:
“thus the problem for the physical sciences consists in bringing
all natural phenomena back to invariable forces, attraction and
repulsion, whose intensity depends on the distance from the
centers of action” (Meulders, 2001, p. 128). On the basis of these
two presuppositions (the impossibility of perpetual motion, and
reduction of all the actions of nature to the forces of repulsion
and attraction), Helmholtz came to establish, in his memoir, the
principle of conservation of ‘vital force.’ The problem he was
confronted with, and which led him to the definition of this
principle, can be summarized by the paradigmatic example of
the movement of a swing, which, when it reaches the highest
point of its movement, finds itself for a brief moment immobile,
before beginning its descent under the influence of gravity. At
that point it once again gains speed and goes up in the opposite
direction, fighting gravity, before decelerating, and stopping once
again under the effect of gravity. The appearance is then that
there are two forces involved: one caused by gravity, and the other
operating in an opposite direction through the effect of the speed
gained by the swing. The first force would be at its maximum
when the swing is at the highest point, whilst the other force
would reach its paroxysm when the swing goes by, very fast, on
the vertical. According to Michel Meulders, “everything seems to
the ‘naive’ observer as if these two ‘forces’ to have a mysterious
relationship to each other, in which the increase in one would
lead to the decrease of the other, and vice versa” (Meulders, 2001,
p. 129).
Alongside the ‘live force,’ which here corresponds to the
effective movement of the swing, Helmholtz established the
necessity to introduce a ‘tension force’ that corresponded to the
potentiality of movement to come, when the swing is at rest at its
apex. The ‘tension forces’ of material bodies were defined as the
product of the forces of attraction or repulsion and the distance
that separates those particles. The ‘live forces’ were themselves
linked to the movement of these particles (Locqueneux, 2009).
The dynamics of Helmholtz was thus entirely reducible to a
mechanical description of nature. In this way he referred all
the forces present in nature (for which Mayer had compiled a
list, as we have seen), examples being electrical, chemical, live
and calorific force, back to these mechanical forces that were
‘live force’ and ‘tension force.’ He then referred to the results
established by Joules between the loss of mechanical force and the
giving off of a quantity of heat (for instance emitted by friction).
These results had given a mathematical formula for calculating
the rise in temperature (the number of degrees of elevation)
in relation to the friction (produced here by the elevation of a
weight), which Mayer had been the first to formulate.
By using this quantitative mathematical result for the
equivalence between heat and mechanical movement, Helmholtz
contended that “the quantity of heat can be increased in an
absolute manner by the mechanical forces” (Helmholtz, 1847,
In: Locqueneux, 2009, p. 126). From a resolutely mechanistic
stand point he then reduced heat to a quantity of movement. He
argued that what had up until then been called ‘quantity of heat’
would in fact only be another way of expressing a ‘quantity of live
force’ of movement within a substance, as well as the ‘quantity
of tension force’ of the internal state of that substance. The first
would correspond to free or perceptible heat, whilst the second
would correspond the latent heat (Locqueneux, 2009). Heat
then, would demonstrate the same distribution between potential
forces and their active expression (if we refer to the Aristotelian
model), the tension forces and ‘live forces.’ Helmholtz concluded
from this that all natural phenomena, whether they applied to
organic or inanimate substances, were caused solely by ‘live
force’s (veres vivae) and tension forces (Spannkraft). The concept
of force, in a Kantian perspective, thus allowed nature to be
rendered intelligible, and to unify the knowledge we have of it
(Locqueneux, 2009).
THE ENERGETICS MODEL
Mayer and Helmholtz made the principle of conservation of force
a fundamental principle, one that allowed for the union between
physics and physiology. However, the concept of energy does
not yet appear in Mayer’s memoir, nor in Helmholtz’s On the
Conservation of Force, published in 1847. It was only with the
introduction of the concept of energy by Thomson, then Rankine,
that Helmholtz adopted this new terminology. Helmoltz then
rewrote his concepts of ‘live force’ and ‘tension force’ in terms
of kinetic energy and potential energy. Terms that would then be
taken up by Breuer in his Studies on Hysteria (Freud and Breuer,
1895b), and will thus have a notable influence on Freudian theory.
Thomson mentions, for the first time, the word ‘energy’ in
1850. He retained the word ‘force’ to designate Newtonian forces
defined by the laws of movement. Energy, would thence designate
all the other kinds of force that Mayer had enumerated in his
memoir. Thomson considered the existence of two categories
of energy, a static energy and a dynamic energy (Locqueneux,
2009). These could also cover the distinction between a latent
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force and an active force that was already present in Helmholtz’s
definition of ‘live forces’ and tension forces. Thus, in his paper On
the universal Tendency in Nature to the Dissipation of Mechanical
Energy. (Thomson, 1852), Thomson states that:
“a load suspended and ready to fall, an electrified body, a
quantity of fuel or coal, contain reserves of energy of a static
nature, a physical body in motion, an area of space crossed by
light or radiant heat waves, a body whose molecules are agitated,
contain reserves of energy of a dynamic nature” (Thomson, 1852,
In: Locqueneux, 2009, p.127)
It needs to be pointed out that only measurable physical
quantities were mentioned here: indeed, the question of the
quantification of energy would remain one of the most important
objectives for all 19th century German physics. This in opposition
to Naturphilosophie’s purely qualitative terms for the description
of nature.
It was also in this same paper that Thomson expressed for the
first time the second principle of thermodynamics. After having
regrouped everything that Mayer designated with the term of
force (mechanical, chemical, magnetic, calorific. . .) under the
one concept of energy; he turned his attention to the output of
real machines, that demonstrated a loss of energy – whereas Sadi
Carnot had laid down the grounds for a principle of conservation,
working from an abstraction of ideal machines which would
experience no reduction in yield. In this way, Thomson
concluded that when heat passed by conduction from one
body, to another body at a lower temperature, some wastage of
mechanical energy would occur. This loss of mechanical energy,
through thermal conduction, would have as a consequence, an
irreversibility in the processes taking place in thermodynamic
machines. This observation would then be generalized to the
statement of a continuous degradation of energy in the universe
(Locqueneux, 2009). Thus, the irreversible propagation of heat –
synonymous in the context of thermodynamic machines with a
loss of yield – would become, from 1852 onward, the tendency to
the universal degradation of mechanical energy (Prigogine and
Stengers, 1979). As Prigogine and Stenger point out: “In this
way, Thomson makes the vertiginous leap from the technology
of motors, to cosmology [. . .]. Thomson’s new theory [. . .] also
makes manifest the consequences of the irreversible propagation
of heat in a world where energy is preserved, this world [. . .] can
only be at the cost of an irreversible waste, a useless dissipation of
a certain quantity of heat. The differences that produce effects are
ceaselessly diminishing within nature” (Prigogine and Stengers,
1979, pp. 184–185).
From the 1850s onward, we find the two principles of
thermodynamics formulated almost in their definitive forms:
the conservation of energy, and the entropy principle. The
reformulation by Thomson, of Helmholtz and Mayer’s work
on the conservation of force, marked the consecration of the
energetics model, and would henceforth dominate the German
scientific landscape of the second half of the 19th century.
In 1853, Rankine performed some level of synthesis of the
Helmoltzian distinction between the ‘live forces’ and the tension
forces, and the unifying concept of energy introduced by
Thomson, by separating energy into two categories: potential
energy (contained in material constructs capable of producing
work), and kinetic energy. This separation was applied not only
to mechanical force, but also to all kinds of physical phenomena;
and covered the Aristotelian concepts of dynamis and energeia,
potency and actuality. In an article written in 1862, Thomson
would substitute the term kinetic energy for that of actual energy,
and it was this terminology that Helmholtz would use when he
went on to adopt the term of energy rather than that of force
(Locqueneux, 2009).
Henceforth Helmholtz would favor the concept of energy
over that of force, in so far as although the latter remains
the ultimate cause of movement, energy as a quantitative
concept, measures the capacity of a system to realize, under
the impulsion of a force, a certain quantity of work, be it
mechanical, caloric, chemical or electrical (Meulders, 2001). To
go back to the example of the swing that had illustrated the
difference between ‘live force’ and tension force: energy, that
is to say the capacity of the swing to perform, under the
impulsion of a force, its mechanical pendulum movement, can
be considered as the sum of two energies, one kinetic (that of
active movement) and the other potential (containing the latent
movement). The first would consist of the speed of the given
movement, whereas the second would be relative to the position
of the swing in space, subject to the forces of gravitation and
gravity (Meulders, 2001). Helmholtz held that the sum of the
kinetic and potential energies always remained constant: “In all
instances of the movement of free material points under the
influence of their forces of attraction or repulsion, the intensity
of which depends only on distance, the reduction of potential
energy is always equal to the increase in live force (kinetic
energy). The sum of the live forces and of the potential energy
is always constant” (Helmholtz, 1882a,b, In: Meulders, 2001,
p. 130).
This integration by Helmholtz of the concept of energy to
his previous developments on the principle of conservation of
force, and the distinction between ‘live force’ (which will become
kinetic energy) and ‘tension force’ (that will subsequently called
potential energy), bears witness to the resolutely mechanical
character of his references to energetics. Helmholtz, along
with Joule or Rankine, used the concept of energy to extend
mechanical principles to other non-mechanical domains. This
was contrary to Mayer, who saw mechanical phenomena as
simply consisting in a particular instance of the phenomena of
transformation of energy (Assoun, 1981). It is right to underline
that Ostwald, professor at Leipzig since 1887, would specifically
oppose this ‘energetic mechanism’ or ‘mitigated energetics,’
raising energetics to the rank of doctrine, assimilable to a quasi-
theological Weltaschaung, and very close to Naturphilosophie. He
would propose a new philosophy of science, the fundamental
concept of which would be that of energy (Assoun, 1981).
His integral energetics formed the basis for an immaterial
ontology, and was akin to a radical monism where “nothing
seems to be able to occur without energy being a part
of it” (Ostwald, 1891, In: Assoun, 1981, p. 170), whereas
Mayer had held on to a dualist model, considering matter
and force as two distinct entities. Ostwald put himself in
opposition to the definition of a potential energy (inherited
from the mechanical concept of tension force), that would
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erase the original and universal reality that is energy in its
actuality.
Freud, as we have seen, idolized Helmholtz. Furthermore,
he would take as his reference the definition, inspired by
Helmholtz, and put forward by Breuer in Studies on Hysteria
(Freud and Breuer, 1895b), that postulated the existence of a
nervous energy, defined as “intracerebral tonic excitation,” the
nature of which could be quiescent (that is potential) or kinetic
(actual) – although Freud would make some alterations to this
definition. Freud’s model then was resolutely that of the mitigated
energetics of Helmholtz, in so far as in essence he used a
functional energetics applied to the functioning of the psyche,
and would regularly use the term ‘work’ to describe the processes
of the unconscious (dream work, work of mourning, etc.). His
description of the movement between different psychological
states, that would entail a mechanical expenditure, would also
be a “specific expression of the general rise in disorder that
the second principle of thermodynamics formulates” (Assoun,
1981, p. 182). This is why, as Paul-Laurent Assoun points out:
“Freud never encounters the temptation, inherent to doctrinal
energetics, to exalt energy as a supra-mechanic active principle,
and to hypostasize it in support of a world view” (Assoun, 1981,
p. 182). Energetics will constitute the basis of all the economic
aspect of the metapsychology, but “never will this model of
deciphering hypostasize into an energetics doctrine” (Assoun,
1981, p. 182–183).
FROM NERVOUS ENERGY TO PSYCHIC
ENERGY
The introduction in the 1850s of the concept of energy, propelled
notably by the influence of Mayer and Helmholtz’s work, appears
as the heuristic key for the coming together of physiology and
physics. This laid down the foundations, as we have seen, for
a resolutely physical epistemological model, which Freud in
turn wholeheartedly adheres to. This model positioned itself in
a radically autonomous position in relation to the Bernardian
revolution in France, which had promoted the singularity and
the independence of physiology as a separate science. From then
on, Helmholtz, and in his wake Brücke, would give themselves
the task of applying the physical principle of the conservation
of energy, to organic phenomena. The concept of energy would
thus make it possible to simultaneously encompass the concept of
force (kinetic, thermic, electrical, magnetic), and phenomena that
belonged to living organisms, such as innervation, irritability, and
some chemical reactions (Assoun, 1981).
What Helmholtz would aim to achieve in his work On the
Conservation of Force (Helmholtz, 1847), consisted in applying
the concept in physics of conservation of energy, to biology, by
making it a postulate for physiological events (Assoun, 1981).
The publication of this work marks an essential turning point in
accomplishing the unification of the natural sciences, through the
application of the principle of conservation of energy. Helmholz
can thus be incontrovertibly recognized as the scientist who
opened the royal road for an energetics concept of physiology,
as well as of psychology. Thus, as Assoun emphasizes, “When in
1883, Freud admits his idolization of the great Berlin master, he
is expressing an emotional adherence to a model that confirms
his epistemological position. It is, furthermore, with the man
who clinched the union of psychology and neurology that he
throws in his enthusiastic lot” (Assoun, 1981, p. 158). In this
resolutely Helmholtzian filiation, when it comes to a desire to
apply the principles of energetics to physiology and anatomy, we
can more specifically postulate the probable influence on Freud
of Helmholtz’s work on neurons and the speed of propagation
of the nervous influx. An area Freud was introduced to when he
himself worked on the dissection and observation of nerve cells
at the Brücke Institute. Nervous innervation and irritability can
thus appear as the energetic manifestations specific to the nervous
systems of living organisms.
We have seen that, from an epistemological point of view,
Freud did not follow Ostwald’s immaterial ontology, which
preached an integral energetics assimilable to a Weltanschauung.
Rather he positioned himself within a mitigated and a mechanic
energetics, in a Helmhotzian filiation. Nevertheless, it is right to
recognize that Ostwald himself had naturally come to question
the possibility for applying the notion of energy to psychological
phenomena, to the extent that, in his manifest on Energy, he
considered the phenomenon of life as a “constant manifestation
of energy” (Ostwald, 1891, In: Assoun, 1981, p. 170). Faithful
to his pan-energetics view of nature, Ostwald was led to state
that “psychological phenomena can be construed as energetic
phenomena, and interpreted as such just as well as any other
phenomena” (Ostwald, 1891, In: Assoun, 1981, p. 172). Ostwald
then, argued for the existence of a nervous energy, and described
a process during psychological activity that gives rise to a
consumption of energy. In so far as he introduced the concept
of ‘psychic energy,’ he can be said to open up the way for Breuer
and Freud’s studies on the energy of the nervous system, or
“intracerebral tonic excitation” (Freud and Breuer, 1895b) for
which Freud would give the term ‘quantity’ in his Project for a
Scientific Psychology (Freud, 1895a). Ostwald would thus have
been the first to see psychic phenomena as being “phenomena
of nervous energy.” Going on to define them as being, like all
energy, a “measurable quantity that obeys the law of conservation
and that of transformation” (Ostwald, 1891, In: Assoun, 1981,
p. 172), that could manifest themselves under diverse forms.
This need for quantification and measurement of psychic energy
will continue throughout the work of Freud. Freud would,
however, renounce giving it an absolute value, and accommodate
himself to attributing to it a measure that was only relative. The
principle of conservation of energy was thus applied by Ostwald
to psychological phenomena in so far as, according to him “no
psychological operation takes place without a corresponding
consumption of energy” (Ostwald, 1891, In: Assoun, 1981,
p. 172). Freud would reapply this introduction of the principle
of conservation of energy in the field of psychology, but without
following the metaphysical consequences that Ostwald upheld
(that is to say the circumventing of the “religious problem
of the soul and the body” through the concept of psychic
energy).
It is then, these models for the implementation of energetics
in physiology, and a fortiori psychology, that Freud, in the wake
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of Helmholtz, would pursue. This was not, however, without
some influence from Ostwald; although he in no way adhered
to Ostwald’s ontological monism, and would retain all through
his work a mechanical energetics close to that of Helmholtz.
This physicalist paradigm would be enriched in Freud’s thinking
by his training in anatomy at the Brücke Institute, where he
devoted himself to the meticulous study of nerve cells. As
Ernest Jones recounts, Freud, then a medical student, was
seduced by the psycho-physiological theories held at the Brücke
Institute – Brücke supported Helmholtz’s school, and also played
an important role at his side in the Berlin Physical Society (Jones,
1953). Du Bois-Reymond reports that Helmholtz and Brücke
had “pledged a solemn oath to put into effect this truth: “No
other forces than the common physical-chemical ones are active
within the organism.” ” (Jones, 1953, p.40). The training that
Freud received at the Brücke Institute was, then, dominated
by the application of the principle of conservation of energy
to organisms: “Organisms differ from dead material entities in
action – machines – in possessing the faculty of assimilation, but
they are all phenomena of the physical world; systems of atoms,
moved by forces, according to the principle of the conservation
of energy discovered by Robert Mayer in 1842, neglected for
20 years, and then popularized by Helmholtz. The sum of forces
(motive forces and potential forces) remains constant in every
isolated system. The real causes are symbolized in science by the
word ‘force’.” (Jones, 1953, p.41).
Here is then, summed up by Jones, the message of the German
school of physiology at the heart of which Freud will be immersed
during his years of training. The works of Brücke devoted to
transformation and to the effects of physical forces in the living
organism, will have a lasting influence on the dynamic view of
metapsychology; and Freud, up until 1926, would argue that
within the psychical apparatus “The Forces assist or inhibit one
another, combine with one another, enter into compromises with
one another, etc.” (Jones, 1953, p. 42).
CONCLUSION
The roots of the Freudian energetics model, heavily influenced
by the discovery of the principle of conservation of force in
thermodynamics, prompt us to understand to origins of the
theoretical model that he develops starting with in Project for a
Scientific Psychology (Freud, 1895a), not as a primarily biological
model, but on the contrary as a paradigm radically grounded in
physics. Freud’s developments on the principle of inertia, then
on the pleasure principle, and later, on the death drive, should
then, be re-situated within the scientific project of the Helmholtz
school, a project to subordinate physiology, and subsequently
psychology, to an ideal of physics. Not disregarding the fact
that, in the 19th century German and Austrian scientific context,
biology had not yet acquired its independence from the ideal
of physics; the model put forward in Project for a Scientific
Psychology (1895a) should therefore not be too swiftly described
as exclusively biological. The physiology training that Freud
received at the Brücke Institute is in no way comparable to the
Bernardian physiology. Bernard had gone in a different direction
introducing a new position. While rejecting vitalism, Claude
Bernard admitted the existence of a singularity of the ‘vital force,’
allowing for an autonomy of experimental physiology as an
independent science in relation to the science of physics.
It is within a biology that is firmly subordinated to the
Berliner Physikalische Gesellschaft’s ideal of physics, dominated
by the influence of Helmholtz, that the energetics model of
the Project for a Scientific Psychology (Freud, 1895a) is rooted.
These considerations could open up a field of enquiry that
would benefit from further investigation: If Freud, notably in
the wake of the publication of The Interpretation of Dreams
(Freud, 1900a), renounces - at least temporarily – grounding his
theorizing on a biological model, is this move also accompanied
by a renouncement of the physicalist epistemological foundations
of that model? This epistemological turning point, already
announced in the letter to Fliess dated 6th December 1896
(Freud, 1950 [1892–1899]), seems to represent a turning point
in the move from a “neuronal apparatus” model in the Project for
a Scientific Psychology (Freud, 1895a), to the abandonment of this
project for basing mental processes on a precise description of the
nervous system. In The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1900a)
Freud will have indeed abandoned the vocabulary of physiology,
no longer referring to the structure and anatomy of neurons, and
will henceforth refer exclusively to a “psychical” apparatus. In
chapter VII, he formulates this renouncement of an anatomically
localized model thus:
“I shall entirely disregard the fact that the mental apparatus
with which we are here concerned is also known to us in the
form of an anatomical preparation, and I shall carefully avoid
the temptation to determine psychical locality in any anatomical
fashion.” (Freud, 1900a, p. 536)
This is only a temporary renouncement, in so much as that
the hope for a physiological model is deferred to such a time
as progress in biology will make it possible to precisely base
psychical processes on a physical substrate. Nevertheless, this
research had henceforth become secondary for Freud, and no
longer constitutes the primary aim of his theorization: “We may,
I think, dismiss the possibility of giving the phrase an anatomical
interpretation...” (Freud, 1900a, pp. 48–49)
Thus, although reference to anatomy is not totally absent from
Freud’s thinking after 1899, it remains a fact that this search for
an anatomical location is sidelined from a topical point of view
from the metapsychology. In many ways it is no longer necessary
to metapsychology, which can do without it. One question does
remain: Is this putting aside (however, temporary it may be) of all
references to an anatomical location for the psychical processes
accompanied by a renunciation of the physics model? It was
this physical model that had enabled him, progressively, to draw
out, on the basis of the idea of nervous energy, the concept
of psychical energy, that will subsequently become libido. We
could be tempted to argue that, despite abandoning a biological
reference in the construction of Freudian metapsychology, the
influence of a physics epistemological model seems to remain.
However, this question is no the object of this research, and will
be the focus of work to come.
These historical elements can, then, prompt us to reconsider
the major metapsychological concepts through the prism of
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the energetics model. In particular the important principles of
thermodynamics as they were understood when they came to
light at the end of the 19th century. A further in-depth look at
the Freudian formulations of the principle of inertia, the pleasure
principle and even the death drive, will be enriched by an analysis
that seeks to bring to light the links between these concepts and
the influence of the physics model, more particularly the model
of thermodynamics at the roots of Freudian thinking.
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